

## Conclusions

The interaction, beginning at least in 1993, between the government and the EZLN, has entailed the reorganisation of the former's electoral politics, and, above all, its concern with security. In my research I have shown that the operations subverting and contesting the dialogue initiated in February 1994 are constitutive of the changed identities of insurgents and security institutions. Over the past decade the insurgencies/government relation has oscillated between *securitisation* and *deseuritisation*. However, it has been maintained as the main internal security/political frontier since then. In this decade the guerrilla organisation has been able to reorganise its discourse around the central notion of indigenous rights and *Zapatismo*. It has provided a discursive surface enabling a variety of actors to speak on behalf of the people in a context within which that has been accepted as the acknowledgment of a political agreement. In short, the novelty attributed to the EZLN is inseparable from the originality of the government's approach to the armed conflict. Civil society has only been supportive of the eventual *democratic effects* of an initial, blunt *antidemocratic force* whose main leader and advisors now dominate a convincing but contestable post-modern rhetoric. In sum, the political class has reinserted its *hegemony* in the last ten years whilst the EZLN succeeded in sedimenting a *myth* as a space of identification for other political actors.

The negotiation surrounding this interaction has constituted a new political frontier in which the meaning of democracy, popular sovereignty and security has constantly been filled with specific content. Nonetheless, society's distancing itself from the methods of the radical movement in 1994, 1996 and 1999-2000 represents a profound estrangement of society from political violence either of insurrectionary or institutional origin.

The EZLN unwillingly made a net contribution to the regime. By accepting to be an official interlocutor for the state, even when that allowed it to preserve a degree of political and geographical autonomy, it became an organisation constituted by the political class as *the ultimate standard of acceptability*. It has consistently been invoked not just by those who

sympathise with it but by the segments of the society who believe that anything seemingly more radical than the EZLN, must be addressed by the national security discourse. Therefore, the EZLN has become the norm of *an unprecedented political frontier* of the internal security state in Mexico.

During 92 years after the Independence (1821 and up to 1914 with the US military presence in Veracruz shores, one year after the Huerta's *coup d'état*), the whole question of *national security*, as an overarching definition, which has at its core the question of national sovereignty, was the physical, geographical ward and identification of the national frontiers. During the post-revolution and the *priista* period (1929-2000) national security was a signifier whose content may be defined by the actual operations that have taken place on its behalf through governmental interventions when defining, identifying and "neutralising" "threats" against a sort of "revolutionary regime". This was the case at least up to 2000, and even during the twelve years of modernising *priistas* had taking over the government (1988-2000). Salinas, Zedillo and the first *panista* administration with Fox (2000-2006) actualised the internal security discourse but did actually not transcend it.

Therefore, in my view, in the post-revolutionary period national security has represented, with contradictory continuities and displacements, above all, a discourse of *internal security*. It was only after 1994 that the internal priority of this security discourse - the neutralisation of the elite's or, more broadly, the allegedly regime's "internal threat" - becomes apparent by means of its *intensification* and thanks to the visibility of a new threshold of acceptability, embodied by the EZLN and shared by the political class and society at large. This *intensification* and *landmarking* is traceable both through the "dialogue" and the operations launched against other radical organisations and *via* a set of institutional decisions. Among them, budgetary allocations, technical, professional and rhetorical tools and a plurality of accommodations and displacements among security actors, directed to nullify guerrilla groupings that emerged in the last decade.

Hence, the EZLN inadvertently has allowed Mexico's elite and society to transiently have a signal of what would be acceptable in Mexican politics when dealing with political violence. This has happened regardless of the reading of the EZLN as a progressive force. Whereas the meaning of national security in the past two centuries was associated with defining geographical frontiers, after 1994, the uprising is to be referred to as the moment in which the internal symbolic limits of acceptability for security actors to intervene were defined by the paradoxical effect of the EZLN's emergence. For all this, I claim that the EZLN deserves the full protection of the state: its protection and articulation with a broader and contemporary approach to security allows the state to represent through its defence the defence of an internal security frontier.

How is this thinkable? The EZLN succeeded in the masterful strategy of presenting itself not as a desperate *military* organisation in need of survival, or as a merely one organisation among others in *Las Cañadas*, but as *the* representative of *an identity rescued from the margins of the Mexican society*. As this thesis has emphasised, the specific strategy of advocating an indigenous identity was only construed *after* the 1994 uprising and has been the political space in which the content of the notion has acquired significance as shown in chapter 2. By means of the uprising and reorganising its discourse, the EZLN persuaded the public opinion and the political class that it deserves more attention than other organisations composed of peasants and indigenous, not because of its actual military original core, but because the EZLN had emerged "to truly represent" those marginalised indigenous people in need of "a voice". The EZLN's *military will* was interpreted by the public at large and the governing political class as a proof of the indigenous genuine political interest, even though the EZLN never reached an agreement on such a set of demands before 1 January 1994. The indigenous cause resulted from the EZLN's articulation with society and engendered a successful interpellation of many marginalised sectors. It can be read as a space of constant negotiation and contestation through which society came to terms with an uprising that reminded everyone of racism and misery. The constitution of the

indigenous people as a political actor, rescued and recreated from the margins of the polity, was accompanied by the idea of a political subject deprived of any threatening feature such as the case of “communist workers” or “socialist peasants”. The EZLN placed it as the legitimate ground from where the enunciation of its eccentric political agenda emerged. It also created *Zapatismo* as an ideology, that is, an ambiguous place within which the popular political will could enunciate a vision of a vague social reform. *Zapatismo* became a conveniently undefined image of a political horizon and a space for the expression of many other emancipatory projects.

On the other hand, the Salinas and Zedillo administration, and later the *panista* Fox government, succeeded in positioning the EZLN as *the radical difference*, yet still only *one more difference* within the general workings of the regime by constructing it as the ultimate *standard of acceptable behaviour of insurgent actors*. Beyond it, and the security discourse would be deployed. The regime established the framework for the conflict and dissolved the paratactical division of the social in which radical antagonism had been thought as essential for the emergence and success of the insurgent project. After 1994 the EZLN has been constantly invoked as the perfect excuse to mobilise an intensified and refined *internal security discourse* predominant in the state. Therefore, in contradistinction with its propaganda, the EZLN actually made a net contribution to the legitimization of the regime and to the strengthening of the security institutions.

I have demonstrated that the interaction and articulation between two sets of practices such as those exhibited by security and insurgent actors, deserves centrality in the analysis and understanding of the behaviour and meaning of both the Mexican state’s political project and the aspirations of insurgents. More generally, I have claimed that an interpretative framework may be useful when analysing the middle-range reciprocal effects between discourses of emancipation and discourses of order and the changing identities of insurgent organisations and the political elite. I have also suggested that “emancipation” and “order” may as well be represented in both insurgent and national security discourses. I have also argued that *discourse theory*, understood as

a theoretical framework that prioritises the contingent interplay of political operations, by recognising both relational and antagonistic linkages, allows us to assume that no identity is essentially more salient than another. Therefore, if similar relevance is granted to security and insurgent actors, the constitution and defence of a project such as “the nation” or that of instituting “the people”, must be equally central when analysing the aforementioned interaction. Similarly, the attempt to constitute a political community, in terms of “the nation” or “the people”, has salience and their articulation has crucial centrality.

The literature that has charted the debate on national security has admitted that the meaning of “national security” is subject to political and theoretical contestation and political negotiation rooted in civil society, inside state institutions and even within clandestine movements. The dispute over the meaning of an insurgent identity is also subjected to processes of political and theoretical debate as can be seen in works related to the EZLN’s uprising.

Most of the literature on the EZLN in particular, is caught within the ideological horizon imposed largely by the PRI regime. This ideology is well represented by what may well be called the ideology of the *Mexican Revolution*, whose more solid axes are the military and foreign policy doctrine and the nationalistic impetus that has been historically attached to it. The convergence of those two axes is constitutive of the Mexican understanding of “national security” and of the respectability that political violence tends to enjoy, as a foundational source of legitimacy for the regime *and* for radical left projects. The significance of the revolutionary imaginary may well be emblematised, for instance, by the contested meaning attributed to the figure of the revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata. His figure was iterated by the PRI’s modernising discourse in the late 1980s and by Salinas in the early 1990s as a driving symbol of the social policy of its *sexenio*. Conversely, it was also interpreted by the FLN, *Comandante Germán* (since the creation of the *Guerrilla Nucleus Emiliano Zapata* on 16 August 1969) and Rafael Guillén, *Marcos* (since the creation of the FLN’s armed wing, the EZLN, in November 1983) as the best symbol for their political spaces of representation that informed the birth of the

*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* and the ideology called neo-Zapatismo. I have claimed that this ideology resulted from the military failure and the ideological creativity of the EZLN after the 1994 revolt and as an effect of the EZLN's rediscovery of Mexico's civil society and the indigenous people as crucial addressees of the insurgent group. The historical myth *Zapata* appears in all the readings on the conflict - as happened with the traditional notion of sovereignty in the national security discourse. However, Zapata, as an untouchable symbol of a revolutionary imaginary seems to have lost - if it ever had it - most of its appeal among broader segments of the Mexican society. In order to make sense of the endeavours challenging the state, these cannot easily be separated from the ideological horizon in which they take place: for instance, the 1994 revolt conjuncture in the context of the modernising assumptions entailed by the Salinas administration as part of the PRI regime or the uprising as part as of a desperate response to the decline of the ultra left in the context of global tendencies. My suggestion has been that the main source of meaning for signifiers such as "national security" and "insurgency" is best understood in an analysis of their reciprocal and antagonistic confrontation. Their latent meaning may also be supplemented by the internal and hidden practices undergirding discourses that vindicate the nobility of "the nation" and that of "the people".

The representation of the EZLN as a legitimate popular resistance instrument has trapped most of the partisan left and affected their hegemonic project, as was evident in the 1994 electoral results. Only after military failure and the society's repudiation of political violence of an *institutional* or *emancipatory* character, were insurgents able to reorganise their discourse. In order to do so, insurgents concealed its "ignoble past", which was symbolised in the attributes of *Comandante Germán*, the main organiser of the National Liberation Front (FLN), from which the EZLN emerged. The reorganisation of the EZLN's discourse implied the displacement of the "peasants" and "workers" as addressees of its project as they were originally considered in the 1994 *Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle*. The reprioritisation of the indigenous people and their constitution as a crucial addressee embodies this displacement and discursive reorganisation.

When justifying its contribution to constituting “the nation”, security actors ground their intervention in delineating the priorities that can be regarded as national security concerns. They intend to guarantee *an* unquestionable content for the notion of popular sovereignty, the one that is determined by the institutional representation of the sovereignty, the Congress and the ultimate source of national security authority, the President. Insurgents, on the other hand, may be defined by their will to resort to arms to provide a meaning for popular sovereignty with the variety of contents derived from their popular struggles. This has been read as an act of subversion and rebellion against the dominant pact as formalised in the Constitution. The antagonisms between insurgent and political actors give meaning to the notion of popular sovereignty where national security acquires its core significance. Particularly important is the confrontation that results from competing processes of identification and the treatment of internal conflicts, especially, those that involve features of insurgency, namely, the threat or actual use of political violence in the name of the political community.

I have defended the idea that the EZLN, contrary to arguments in the literature, is not a “post-modern” organisation, but a hegemonic one with a post-modern vocabulary. More importantly, I define it as an oscillation between a social movement and a guerrilla organisation. In saying that, I claim that the EZLN - and its correlative security state - is exemplary of the manner in which to understand political identity as a process, and not as a fixed and definitive operation. In sum, the Mexican case offers an example of a process of *identification* rather than of *identity*, as the starting point for political analysis. This does not exclude from the picture the fact that the EZLN is actually disputing the definition of the political field despite its claim of not being interested in power “as generally understood”. The EZLN’s political practices are hegemonic, as I have tried to show in the case of *Las Cañadas*. Among these practices are the exclusion of other alternatives to the armed path, expropriation of land, expulsion of non-*Zapatistas* and stigmatisation of enemies and critics outside the left and within the social and partisan left after 1994. Certainly, these practices could not be possible without a network of

articulations that allow the EZLN to constantly renegotiate its new symbolic hegemony over other groupings which have struggled to gain the representation of “the people” in the “conflict zone” before and after 1994.

I have claimed that insurgent and institutional actors can represent competing notions of political sovereignty when they speak and operate on behalf of either “the people” or “the nation”. To that extent, when doing political analysis, in order to dismantle any essentialist notion of insurgencies and national security, it should be understood that it is in their interaction where we can find illuminating aspects of insurgent and security limitations and assumptions. The actual dominant meaning given to those notions may come from effective interventions of which the rhetoric is one, while institutional and organisational operations are another. In short, the political frontier *between* security and insurgent actors tells us more about the specific character of their respective discourses, than can their overt “democratic” and “national” claims. Because central attention has been given to dismantle threats to the internal sovereignty of the regime I claim that the national security discourse is in fact little more than an *internal security discourse*.

The EZLN instigated two crucial processes. First, the electoral reorganisation of the whole political class agreed to *desecuritize* the EZLN. In so doing, it recreated the space for the dispute of national power by according electoral changes and giving name to the space of contestation with the EZLN by baptising it in the name of the indigenous rights and dissipating any generalised insurrectionary event. Second, the EZLN’s emergence also unleashed the most relevant reorganisation of the internal security state in three decades.

In *desecuritising* the conflict, the Mexican political class accepted the EZLN as the state’s interlocutor, granting it a special status, and preventing the rebellion to grow as an armed movement. In accepting the dialogue, the EZLN obliged itself to disengage in military operations. Simultaneously, it was able to transform itself by reordering its discourse through the central notion of *Zapatismo*. This became a principle of reading and principle of inscription for popular



struggles because of its ambiguity. *Zapatismo* then become a *myth*, from which the system could be challenged to the limit of the 1994 foundational agreement as I have shown in chapter 2 and 3.

The appearance of the EPR in 1996, after the massacre of seventeen peasants in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero, made visible the 1994 political frontier as a political agreement with wider validity than the mere EZLN/government concrete difference. The emergence of a new guerrilla group without explicit intentions of entering into dialogue with the government put into question the success of the original framing of the 1994 conflict. It also defied the EZLN as a supposedly non-militaristic guerrilla group and, most of all, put into question the validity of the 1994 boundary. After the radical estrangement of the political class from the EPR, which was initially considered a “terrorist” organisation, and after the subtle EZLN estrangement operation from the new guerrilla actor, the frontier demonstrated its usefulness to the regime in general and for the security discourses in particular. The combined operation of a *logic of difference* with a *logic of equivalence*, enabled the government and the political class to deactivate any possibility of a coalition among insurgent actors and radical non-armed communities sympathising locally and regionally with them. Such an eventuality might have created a regionally intensified dislocation.

In 1996 the EPR showed that the iteration of insurgent discourses was possible even after the 1994 arrangement between the political class and the EZLN. At the same time it demonstrated that any military and political endeavour and subsequent insurgent failure would benefit the strengthening of the system and the reactivation of the internal security state.

In 1999-2000, the exclusion of the CGH from the polity and its placement as part of a total “other” illustrated this combined process and the central aim of any security discourse. This aim was the nullification of any possibility for constituting “the people” understood as an insurgent army of those unemployed or “exploited”, displaced and expelled by the dynamics of mainstream society. The CGH unwillingly contributed to its own defeat as it made visible an exclusionary politics. It was unable to learn from EZLN’s lessons as I claimed in chapter 4. The core object of the national security discourse is to avoid the transformation of any radical

movement into a long-term, cross-class and nationally threatening “enemy” of the indispensable stability of the commercial and financial markets.

The 1999-2000 student movement also showed the reach and limitations of insurgency discourses when dealing with national actors at the centre of mainstream politics within communities that may accept the insurgent call only to the extent that it does not have effective repercussions in their own field of activity. Its radicalism appeared in a context where exclusionary politics are accepted under the condition that its moment of effectiveness became a token challenge as opposed to an effectively dangerous defiance of the hegemonic pact. The student movement missed the opportunity to iterate the creative compromises and discourse deployed by the EZLN. The visibility of its drawing of political frontiers within the student assembly and against all sources of political authority (UNAM, local and federal government) and its proximity to and uncritical acceptance of insurgent discourses, positioned it in the national security agenda from the start. It also allowed the CGH to be, paradoxically, cohesive and divided until the moment of its failure. The CGH was momentarily hegemonic in relation to the operations of student segments that sympathised with the centre left government and in relation to the majority of the student that rejected the movement. The CGH’s intransigence was the result of an impoverished intellectual climate within the student movement as much as illustrative of the relevance acquired by the PRD in Mexico City. It showed the danger of the continuous ineffectiveness of other political currents different from the left within the UNAM’s student movement and it was a reflection of the authoritarian stances of the society when dealing with its lacks and backwardness.

The student movement exposed the unacceptability of radical politics, especially when the ignoble moment, that is, the moment of exclusionary politics that all radical movements require, was extensively visible to the broader public. In this case, the media was the decisive agent. The opposition from the communities affected by the movement, in this case the variety of segments of the UNAM that did not support the nine-month strike and the regional and national

groups denounced it as a sign of unacceptable politics. Not surprisingly, they informally converged and created the public climate in which the PFP intervention was possible and even silently supported by a wide segment of the UNAM - a traditionally tolerant environment - and the partisan left.

As the EZLN and the EPR had done, the student movement unwillingly created the conditions for the internal security state to be intensified, reactivated and refined. Through the use of the newly constituted Preventive Federal Police (PFP) and the public support that appreciated the PFP intervention, the CGH became the perfect example for the local and federal government to support intervention with security forces.

In 2001, the *Zapatista March* offered the scenario within which two competing notions of popular sovereignty were exposed. As I have shown in chapter 5, after the 2000 displacement of the PRI from the presidency, for the first time in 71 years, by the centre-right coalition led by the PAN, the EZLN understood that it had to re-position its identity. That redefinition was badly needed in a context in which its strategic definition of being *rebellious* as opposed to *revolutionary* in relation to *the regime*, had lost purchase after the Fox electoral victory and the displacement of the PRI from the Presidency. President Fox and Rafael Guillén (*Marcos*) harshly disputed the meaning of the march. The EZLN took advantage of the mobilisation towards Mexico City in order to make evident that it had re-connected itself with social organisations and guerrilla movements after having showed a significant estrangement from the latter, such as the EPR in 1996. It also re-created its network of loyalties and its ability to use the media to the extent that it practically forced the political class to allow the EZLN to address the Chamber of Deputies. Ironically, it counted on the PRI support and, interestingly, on President Fox's advocacy, who was clearly in favour of the indigenous rights bill. Fox and *Marcos* ended up facing the PAN's rejection.

During the march, the PFP acquired a prominent role. By accompanying and protecting the march, the internal security state was also able to take advantage of the EZLN mobilisation in

order to legitimise the system as one able of incorporating any divergence and even protect it. It presented the PFP not just as a safety and security institution, but as the state instrument to ward the political frontier established in 1994 by which the interaction between security and insurgent actors had been continuously subverted and negotiated to the limits allowed by the general stability of the system. In its intervention, the PFP deserved the unwonted approbation of both the government and the EZLN.

The dominant projects in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate rejected the EZLN's indigenous rights bill, despite the unprecedented fact that this bill had the support of the President. Popular organisations and segments of the left contested the modified constitutional reform passed by the Congress. Nevertheless, the Judiciary and most of the local governments ratified it. This demonstrated that the Mexican system after 1994 was able not only to deal democratically with an insurgent actor, despite the relatively successful mobilisation, but to temporarily subject it to the hegemonic logic of the system, alongside the general reconstitution and refinement of the internal security discourse.

In short, it might be said that the EZLN, in contradiction to the readings which understand it to be a contribution to democratic politics, made visible the prior internal security state and unwillingly exacerbated its intensification. At the same time, it created a space of inscription and *limited acceptability* of radical struggles. These developments occurred under the condition of the EZLN being disconnected from the military call it briefly issued in 1994 and was taken up by the EPR in 1996.

Until 2004, the political frontier constituted in 1994 has paradoxically been highly useful to the regime as it has also been for some insurgent actors. The latter are militarily and politically unable to fulfil the dream of the far left, i.e. a national dislocation and the interruption of the regime in order to imbue "the people" with new meaning. The former has been able to unleash a profound reorganisation of the security forces and institutional and legal reforms in favour of security at the cost of accepting a daily negotiation with a force that still disputes the meaning of

popular sovereignty and the subsequent administrative and political contradictions derived from accepting the EZLN control of *Las Cañadas*.

Apart from isolated military operations, such as EZLN skirmishes in the first week of 1994 and the EPR intervention in 1996, they have been limited to specific regions underground reconnections. In framing the field in which the dispute over the competing notion of popular sovereignty was embodied and flagged by the insurgent and institutional actors, the government has been able to legitimise itself. Through the logic of incorporating the EZLN as *one more of the differences*, despite the contradiction of accepting levels of regional autonomy in *Las Cañadas*, and by introducing the quasi formalisation of another state *within the state*, the Mexican political class has so far succeeded when dealing with insurgent threats. In doing so it has largely resorted to invoking the EZLN's politically correct behaviour as *a measurement of acceptability* in a broader context of a sophisticated internal security discourse. The regime's success can be attributed to a combination of traditional and modern techniques, in which the privileging of the traditional military mobilisation, as has occurred in countries to the north and south of Mexico, has been seemingly diminishing in relevance because the security discourse has been redistributed in a number of institutions.

The 1994 EZLN transformation - from an openly insurgent organisation- into a merely uncomfortable radical movement, acceptable to the regime and to the traditionally conservative Mexican society at large, has enormous consequences. It has permitted the political class and society, for first time in Mexican history, to have an internal security referent through which it can defend an ideology of emancipation - *Neo-Zapatismo* - without engaging in resolving the puzzles opened by the EZLN's emergence. Thus, this organisation has been articulated as *a standard of acceptability* of what can be expected and will be tolerated from insurgent actors. The EZLN also embodies the material impossibility of its realisation as a rebellious reality at the national level. Therefore, it is both a *space of representation* for popular struggles and resistance

and a *mark of acceptability* beyond which the internal security state has made itself visible and has largely legitimised its renewal.

To that extent, the sometimes hysterical critique of the EZLN and other insurgent and security actors, coming from some segments of the three main parties, seems to be immaterial. This is so if we consider that the guerrilla and radical groups have already been construed *de facto* as a net contributor to the general stability of the regime which sporadically mobilises them as feasible threats - to the cost of the daily surveillance, the differentiation of “marginal” conflicts and the acceptance of a competing authority in *Las Cañadas*. They have served as base of a profound strengthening and legitimisation of internal security institutions and the emergence of the blatant visibility of a new epoch of “national security” discourse in Latin America. For the time being, to broader segments of the population, the guarantees provided by an order embodied in the internal security system are more appealing than the uncertainties represented by emancipatory discourses.

My general intention has been to highlight the validity and centrality of the insurgent/security divide as an object of analysis that can be better understood by assuming that there is fluidity in the process of identity formation. More broadly, I believe that it is necessary to analyse security and insurgent discourses as two spheres that interact with each other and are altered in that interaction. As a consequence, their interaction is thinkable as space of triangulation of operations and rhetorical displacements, allowing us to acquire deeper insights into the ideological pretensions of actors that speak in the name of the state/people and those who claim to act on behalf of the nation/people. For instance, I claim that in dealing with insurgencies there is mainly a coherent combination of logics of inclusion and exclusion, and not a government’s internal intractable contradiction when dealing with armed challengers as some authors have suggested. Additionally, as I have claimed, if a regime is able to deal flexibly with armed insurrections, nullifying the legitimacy and actual possibility of their military engagements, such a system can be said to have good health. The Mexican peculiarity is that the

EZLN enjoys both stability and limited success as a result of its creativity and the openness of the system.

Since my endeavour is exploratory and located in the horizon of the theory of hegemony, my research generates more questions than answers. A number of queries arise from the idea that there exists an agreed upon space of negotiation and contestation among security and insurgent discourses. I would like to present what I consider the most salient inquiries arising from my research and place them in the context of the theory of hegemony, this being a political practice inherent in the formation of any political subjectivity. First, if we assume that hegemony involves a dimension of uneven power as constitutive of any identity, and if any security or insurgent actor presents itself as an embodiment of something universal (the people, the nation, the state), the very claim of such a universality involves the radical exclusion of others thought as external to it. This assumption seems to be lacking a minimal normative understanding of politics whose boundaries appeared basically defined by hegemonic displacements. Second, there is an irreducible tension in any identity if we assume that the ideas of the universal and the particular are inseparable when constituting political discourses. Consequently, if they are incarnated either in the emancipatory project offered by a guerrilla group or in the ordering of a security institution, the limit of the acceptability of their actual practices seem always undefined. Then, are they constructing and/or destructing the community? How and when can we know that insurgent or security actors act in the well-being of the community? At what point is the tension between universal goals (security order, insurgent justice) and concrete practices (security repression, insurgent execution) dissolved to give birth to authoritarian or democratic openings? If we assume that insurgencies may be valid sources for popular sovereignty, how do we make them accountable to those outside them? Third, if we assume that the concept of empty signifiers, such as *democracy* and, in this context, *order* and *security* or *emancipation* and *justice*, are to some extent the representation of universalizing attempts for representing antagonistic communities, when society at large should accept those attempts as representative of a legitimate community?

Finally, there is a set of questions that are related to the process of representation available to security or insurgent actors. Assuming that hegemony is always conveyed through relations of representation (the EZLN in the name of the indigenous, the Mexican government on behalf of the state and society), and because by definition, there is always a gap between the community being represented and its representative, does the EZLN represent the leadership, and rank and file of the EZLN, or the indigenous people? Does it represent both to the same extent? And if there is a generalised acceptance of the EZLN as representative of indigenous people, what status is granted to those who are not represented by the EZLN? Or on the other hand, does the state mainly represent the values and interest of the financial elite, the political class as part of the partisan elite, the plurality of interests of the security community that offers itself as ward of all the former? When a relation of representation embodies a valid goal, who is to decide about it, if not those who are said to be emancipated or securitised? Thus, if the EZLN or the Mexican state “give voice” to valid communities, these being, the *Las Cañadas* indigenous or the civil society and security actors and those demanding their intervention, what happens with *those without voice*? For instance the *non-Zapatistas* and non-paramilitaries, or people sharing partisan projects, seem to be unable to attract the same respect unless they become part of the guerrilla or the paramilitary groupings when security crises emerge. I consider that such a *larger community without voice* deserve to escape the polarisation and victimisation provoked by the emergence of those that speak in the name of the state and/or on behalf of the people. In my opinion the killing of 45 unarmed women, men and children in Acteal on 22 December 1997 are part of such a community victimised by the polarisation lived out in Chiapas even when the forces involved in the conflict made them appear as part of their victims.